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2 Introduction
Long-term care represents a major source of health expenditures for the elderly. At the national level,
expenditures on long-term care account for 10% of the total health expenditure and is expected to
grow as the population ages (CBO (1999), CB0 (2004), Brown and Finkelstein (2008)). Currently
about 60% of long-term care spending is covered by Medicaid, while less than 10% is paid the by
private insurance market (CBO (1999), CB0 (2004), Brown and Finkelstein (2008)).
Economists have proposed various potential explanations for the limited demand for the private long-
term care insurance, including Medicaid crowdout (Brown and Finkelstein (2008)), bequest motives
(Lockwood (2010)), intergenerational contracting (Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)) and house equity as
substitutes for formal long-term care insurance (Davidoff (2009)). Despite the considerable attention
the limited size of the private long-term care insurance market has received, the majority of the prior
studies are based on the neo-classical assumption that an individual is fully rational and seeks to
maximize his or her utility given a budget constraint. On the other hand, violations of basic level of
rationality in related contexts have been widely documented in the literature, e.g., choices of Medicare
Part D (Kling et al. (2012)) and 401(k) plan enrollments (Madrian and Shea (2011)).
As is common in economic models with risk and uncertainty, studies on the long-term care insurance
market often assume without justification that an individual updates his or her risk assessment by
the Bayes’ Rule, which requires a high degree of rationality. The previously mentioned evidence
of behavioral distortions calls into question the validity of the Bayesian assumption. In addition
to understanding human psychology and informing economic theory, the study of whether people
are rational (i.e. Bayesians) also has important welfare implications. As observed in Spinnewijn
(2012), biased risk assessments and low valuation could lead to the same demand response (i.e.,
under-insurance), but have opposite policy implications.
In this paper, we use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) panel, which surveys a
representative sample of US seniors about their longevity prospects to examine whether the Bayesian
assumption holds. Specifically, I test for (1) whether people’s longevity predictions are responsive to
new information, e.g., recent parental death which conveys information about genetic risks, lifestyle-
related health risks, etc; (2) whether people’s longevity predictions respond more to the arrival of
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precise information (parental death) than less clear information (parent-in-law’s death); (3) whether
the magnitudes of these updates are in accordance with theoretical predictions.
We find that individuals’ longevity predictions are responsive to new health-related information,
and consistently more responsive to precise information (parental death) than imprecise informa-
tion (parent-in-law’s death). The magnitudes of these updates lie between the predicted lower and
upper bounds of rational updates, but do not perfectly coincide with the predicted values and are
sensitive to model specifications. We conclude that there is no strong evidence against the Bayesian
assumption. We point out that the Bayesian assumption is only one aspect of the rationality hy-
pothesis. From qualitative survey data, We find evidence of inattention to government subsidy of
long-term care insurance, mistaken beliefs that long-term care is covered by Medicare and tendency
to procrastinate on long-term care insurance purchasing decision. The evidence suggests irrationality
may cause individuals to under-insure through these other venues.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related empirical and
theoretical literature. Section 3 describes the part of the Health and Retirement Study(HRS) data
that is relevant for our study. Section 4 gives the empirical estimation strategy and presents the main
results and extensions. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
3 Literature Review
Long-term care represents a major source of health expenditures for the elderly and thus plays a
central role in determining the well-being of the elders. Naturally, seniors face higher health risks
than the working-age population. In the event of negative health shocks, the lack of physical mobility
undermines their ability to function independently. Hence, opting for some form of long-term care
becomes inevitable. The cost of long-term care is likely to be substantial. The combination of high
probability, low substitutability, and high cost of care utilization means that long-term care represents
a significant source of financial risk for the retirees.
The financial risks imposed by long-term care are not only at the individual level. Currently, expendi-
tures on long-term care account for 10% of the total health expenditure in the United States and the
proportion is expected to grow as the population ages (CBO (1999), CB0 (2004), Brown and Finkel-
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stein (2008)). Perhaps more importantly, the composition of expenditure is highly skewed: about 60%
of the total expenditure is covered by Medicaid, while less than 10% is paid the by private insurance
market (CBO (1999), CB0 (2004), Brown and Finkelstein (2008)). The heavy government involve-
ment in the long-term care market imposes considerable pressure on public budgets. To understand
the supply and demand of long-term care insurance is the first step toward improving the efficiency
of the long-term care market, which will go a long way toward alleviating the government’s budget
concerns.
In recent years, there has been a budding economic literature studying the distortions in the long-term
care market. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) show evidence that Medicaid crowds out private long-term
care insurance. Their analysis is especially salient at the lower end of the wealth distribution. However,
the existence of mean-tested programs does not explain the limited size of the private long-term care
market across all wealth distributions.
Lockwood (2010) takes the slow spend-down pattern of wealth during retirement across all wealth
distributions as evidence against the canonical precautionary saving hypothesis, and argues that be-
quest motives can potentially explain the limited size of the private long-term market among wealthy
individuals. However, as observed by Davidoff (2010), the utility function specification in Lockwood
(2010) implies decreasing relative risk aversion at the high end of the wealth distribution. It is not
clear to what extent the prediction of the model depends on this nonstandard modeling assumption.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) study the role of intergenerational risk-sharing in the demand for long-
term care insurance. In their model, the elder family members and the young family members contract
with each other with respect to interfamily resource transfers. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) argue that
such arrangements reduce the scope for formal private long-term care insurance purchases. However,
the nature of such family contracts is likely to vary substantially across cultures, while the limited size
of the private long-term care insurance market is a common phenomenon throughout the developed
world (OECD(2011)).
Davidoff (2009) also studies the role of substitutes for formal long-term care, and argues that house
equity provides individuals with self-insurance against health risk during retirement. But Davidoff
(2009) acknowledges that the model he uses fails to incorporate individuals’ “difficulty [in] obtaining
or processing information concerning the distribution of likely future long-term costs, the terms of
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contracts with insurer, [etc.]”
Despite the considerable attention the limited size of private long-term care insurance market has
received, the majority of the prior studies are based on some variants of the neo-classical assumption
that an individual is rational and seeks to maximize his or her utility given the budget constraint.
However, we have accumulating evidence that individuals’ choices of insurance plans, arrangements
of retirement savings and enrollment decisions of welfare programs are subject to behavioral bias.
Studying experimental data on Medicare Part D choices, Kling et al. (2012) find that directly providing
the information which individuals can also actively access for free causes 28% of sample to switch their
Medicare Part D options. Madrian and Shea (2001) observe a similar switching pattern in 401(k)
enrollments when the default choice changes. Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) report that following the
privatization of the Swedish social security system, individuals allocated assets disproportionately to
the stock market and the specific portfolio choices indicate that they paid undue attention to the most
recent returns. These behavioral distortions reflect individuals’ inattention to relevant information
and difficulty in assessing probabilistic events. We suspect that similar irrationality problems also
exist in the long-term care insurance market.
For example, opting for a long-term care insurance policy requires an individual to actively access
relevant information and conduct benefit and cost analysis based on the information obtained. Inat-
tention to relevant information would have implications on the individual’s demand for long-term care
insurance. Moreover, a typical person purchases long-term care insurance in their 60s but expect the
delivery of care in their 80s (Brown and Finkelstein (2008)). The long-term care insurance purchasing
decision depends on the individual’s subjective evaluations of uncertain events over the 20-year win-
dow. Incorrect or poor evaluations of probabilistic events would distort his or her insurance purchasing
behaviors.
Despite the plausibility of the existence of individual irrationality, we are not aware of any study
systematically examining the role of behavioral bias in the purchasing decision of the long-term care
insurance. The gap in the literature can be partly attributed to the complexity of human psychology,
which calls into question the “robustness” of any specific behavioral assumption. How do we specify
economic models when individuals are subject to heterogeneous psychological bias? What if the
psychological assumption we impose on the model does not correctly capture individuals’ decision-
7
making processes?
Spinnewijn (2012) develops a model to quantify the extent of welfare distortion in an adversely selected
insurance market, allowing agents’ perceived value of insurance to deviate from the underlying true
value of insurance. The key theoretical insight underlying this approach is the distinction between the
“decision utility functions” and the “true utility functions”. The former affects agents’ choices which
incorporate irrationalities; the latter truly reflects agents’ utilities, but is unobserved by the policy
maker. The advantage of this reduced-form approach is that it obviates the need to fully calibrate a
structural model, thus allowing for heterogeneous behavioral biases.
Although theoretically appealing, this reduced-form approach poses additional challenge for empirical
estimation. In this thesis, we focus on examining a specific source of behavioral biases, namely,
whether individuals’ probabilistic assessments are subject to behavioral heuristics. Since individuals’
demands for long-term care insurance are closed related to their mortality predictions, we focus on
how individuals form their mortality predictions and the potential distortions in the formation process.
From the point of view of Bayesian belief formation, individuals update subjective probabilities with
respect to new information. The magnitude of adjustment depends on the relevance of the new
information. All else equal, “accurate” signals lead to more updating than “fuzzy” signals.
Consider the death of a parent due to health reasons versus the death of a parent-in-law due to
health reasons. Both are mortality-relevant events, which, according to Bayesian theory, cause an
individual to decrease his or her longevity prediction. Both a parent’s and a parent-in-law’s death
convey information about mortality risk relative to the population average, but a parent’s death also
conveys information about family-specific health risk (i.e., genetic risk, lifestyle-related health risk,
etc.). Hence, the parental death is a more “precise” signal than the in-law’s death. If individuals form
their mortality beliefs rationally, we would expect individuals to update more in response to a parent’s
death, relative to a parent-in-law’s death. On the other hand, if individuals behave “irrationally”, then
we might see unexpected patterns of belief formation, which would have implications on their demand
for long-term care insurance.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which has information on both the respondents’ parents’
and parents-in-laws’ mortality as well as the respondents’ subjective longevity predictions, provides
an invaluable tool for our study. The subjective mortality predication variables in the HRS have
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been used extensively by economists. One notable feature of these survival prospect variables is the
responsiveness to adverse health events, onset of functional limitations and aging. (See for example
Smith et al (2001), Hurd and McGarry (2002), and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)). This evidence
suggests that individuals utilize available information to form longevity expectations. However, to our
knowledge, no prior work has focused on comparing the magnitudes of the updates with respect to
fine versus coarse information.
Using the aforementioned panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we test whether
individuals update their longevity predictions differently in response to parents’ and parents-in-law’s
death. We find that individuals decrease their subjective longevity predictions with respect to parents’
death. We find no statistically significant covariation of subjective longevity predictions and parents-
in-law’s death. These findings are roughly consistent with the hypothesis of rational (i.e. Bayesian)
belief formation. We also find that the magnitudes of the updates due to parental death lie between
the predicted lower and upper bounds of rational updates, but do not perfectly coincide with the best
in-sample prediction and are sensitive to model specifications. We conclude that there is no strong
evidence against the Bayesian assumption.
4 Data
In this thesis, we use the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a biannual
longitudinal survey of more than 26,000 Americans above 50 in age and provides rich information on
the respondents’ and their family members’ demographic information, insurance status, health and
functioning, belief and expectation, among other things. Currently, the HRS data includes five entry
cohorts: the 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) cohort, the 1993 Study of Assets and Health
Dynamics (AHEAD) cohort, the 1998 Children of Depression and War Baby cohort, and the 2004
Early Baby Boomer cohort. We incorporate all released core interview data from the 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 surveys on all five cohorts. Table 1
describes the characteristics of each cohort and summarizes the average birth year, gender composition,
and long-term insurance coverage status of each survey cohort.
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Cohort Cohort Year of Number of Mean Fraction Fraction covered Fraction covered 
Number Name Entry IndividualsBirth of by LTC in  ANY by LTC in  ALL 
Observed  Year Female survey wave survey waves
0 HRS/AHEA  - 1927 0.505 0.314 0.029
1 AHEAD 1993 1916 0.632 0.213 0.044
2 CODA 1998 1927 0.587 0.207 0.072
3 HRS 1992 1936 0.535 0.242 0.01
4 WB 1998 1945 0.506 0.258 0.02
5 EBB 2004 1950 0.48 0.152 0.03
Table 1: Characteristics of Each HRS Cohort
Central to our analysis are the subjective mortality prediction variables. Specifically, the HRS survey
asks the following question.
Using a number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that you think there is absolutely no chance
and “100” means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen, what do you think
are the chances that you will live to at least Y?
where Y is 75, 85, or a number that is 10-15 years above the respondent’s age at interview. Which
question is asked depends on the survey wave and the age of the respondent at that interview. This
gives us three variables of interests: ProbLiv75, ProbLiv85 and ProbLiv10, which correspond to
subjective probabilities of living past 75 years, living past 85 years and living for another 10-15 years.1
Note that since not all three questions are asked in all survey waves, the actual samples we use for
the regression analysis vary. The table below summarizes the distribution of the number of waves for
which an individual is observed.
1In all waves except Waves 2A and 3A, the respondents are asked to estimate the probability of living past 75. In
addition, respondents are also asked to estimate the probability of living past 85 in Waves 1, 2H, 3H and 4.
In Wave 2A and 3A, i.e., the second and the third waves of the AHEAD cohort, the respondents are not asked about
subjective probabilities of living to 75, since the majority of this cohort is near or past 75 years at the time of the
interviews. To accommodate these elder respondents, the survey asks the respondents about the probability of living to
a certain year (a number in 80-100), depending on their ages in 1993.
From Wave 5 on, the wording of the mortality prediction question depends on the respondent’s age at the interview:
respondents are asked about their subjective probabilities of living to X years, where X is typically 10 or so greater than
the respondent’s age at that interview. Since we observe the birth year of the respondents and the time of interviews,
we can infer which X is used in the interview. The table in the appendix summarizes which question is asked in which
wave.
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Number of Waves for
 which an Individual Probliv75
is Observed No. of Individuals % No. of Individuals % No. of Individuals %
0 12,517 43.3 16,557 57.3 4,826 16.7
1 1,550 5.4 3,776 13.1 3,518 12.2
2 1,681 5.8 1,244 4.3 3,534 12.2
3 2,875 10 2,562 8.9 2,838 9.8
4 3,714 12.9 4,738 16.4 4,129 14.3
5 2,374 8.2 0 0 2,742 9.5
6 1,964 6.8 0 0 6,688 23.2
7 1,970 6.8 0 0 373 1.3
8 232 0.8 0 0 229 0.8
9 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probliv85 Probliv10
Table 2: Distribution of the Number of Waves for which An Individual is Observed
These subjective probability variables share two important features. First, they covary with health
conditions and age in an expected way, which is consistent with findings of the prior literature. The
correlation matrices in the appendix summarize the relationship between the subjective mortality
prediction variables and the available health shock and aging variables we observe in the HRS data.
Second, the distributions of the dependent variables cluster around multiples of 10, most noticeably
at 0, 50, and 100.
Figure 1: Histograms of Dependent Variables
The focal point issue of self-reported probabilities is widely observed in the prior literature. See for
example Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Hurd and McGarry(1995) and Li Gan et al.(2005). This
feature of the subjective probabilities makes it challenging to directly interpret them as “probabilities”.
By definition, probability is a well-defined cardinal measure. For a given subjective probability variable
ProbLivX, the cardinality assumption requires ProbLivX = j + 1 to be “one percentage point more
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likely than” ProbLivX = j, and ProbLivX = k × i to be “k times as likely as” ProbLivX = i for all
relevant values of i’s and j’s. The clustering pattern of the self-reported probabilities call in to question
the validity of this assumption in our context. On the other hand, the sensible correlation between
these subjective longevity predictions and the health deterioration and aging variables suggest that
these subjective probability variables do convey some information about the respondents’ perception
of mortality risks. We posit that the value of the dependent variables contain “ordinal” but not
necessarily “cardinal” information. For example, an individual who reports 30% chance of living
past 75 in Wave T and 20% chance of living past year 75 in Wave ( T+1) might think that his
(her) probability of living past 75 is lower in (T+1), but not necessarily 10 percentage point lower.
The ordinal interpretation puts lower requirement on individuals’ understanding of probability. If we
interpret the subjective reports as ordinal ranks of likelihoods, the 25% respondents who answer either
0 or 100 to the question that asks about the likelihood of living past 75 may simply indicate “very low
probability” or “very high probability”. On the other hand, if we interpret these numbers as cardinal
probability measures, 0 and 100 literally mean infinite degree of certainty.
The covariation of the respondents’ mortality predictions and the mortality status variables of their
parents and parents-in-law play the key role in our analysis. The table below summarizes the number
of individuals whose mother/ father/ mother-in-law/ father-in-law dies during the survey waves. 2
No. of Percent
Individuals of Sample
Mother Died 4,720 16.5
Father Died 2,331 8.2
Mother-in-law Died 3,303 16.8
Father-in-law Died 1,858 9.5
Parent Died 6,165 21.6
In-law Died 4,493 23
Parent or In-law Died 8,838 42.7
Table 3: Number of Individuals Whose Parent/Parent-in-law Dies during Survey Waves
Based on this information, we construct four individual-year level binary variablesMomDeathit/DadDeathit/
MominlawDeathit/DadinlawDeathit which = 1 if the respondent’s mother (father/ mother-in-law/
2For Waves 2 and 3 of the AHEAD cohort and from From wave 6 forward each respondent provides information
only about their own mother and father. Information about parents-in-law is based on the spouse’s responses. The
respondent’s parents-in-law’s mortality status will be missing if the respondent’s spouse is not alive in that wave.
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father-in-law) is not alive in wave T and = 0 otherwise. These will serve as the key independent
variables in the empirical analysis. We further group the two parental mortality variables to a single
binary variable ParDeathit, which = 1 if either MomDeathit = 1or DadDeathit = 1. Similarly, I
define InlawDeathit as the combined in-law mortality variable.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative density distributions of the Probliv75, Probliv85 and Probliv10 vari-
ables, separately by parent’s and parent-in-law’s mortality statuses. Panel (1) compares the distribu-
tion of the sample whose ParDeath = 0 and whose ParDeath = 1. Panel (2) compares the distribu-
tion of the sample whose InlawDeath = 0 and whose InlawDeath = 1. Graphically, we clearly see
that the cumulative density distributions corresponding to Pardeath = 0 are “right shifts” of those
corresponding to Pardeath = 1, while the relationship between the distributions of Inlawdeath = 0
and those of Inlawdeath = 1 are much less clear. The Z-scores (16.7, 14.1, and 16.2 from Panel (1)
and 4.7, 2.8, and 2.8 from Panel (2)) of two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test are positive and
statistically significant, indicating that the distributions of the subjective survival probabilities of the
Pardeath = 1 (Inlawdeath = 1) sample is lower than those of the Pardeath = 0 (Inlawdeath = 0).
(a) by ParDeath
(b) by InlawDeath
Figure 2: Distribution of Dependent Variables, Separated by Pardeath and Results from Mann-
Whitney Test
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Despite the sensible result, we caution that in our context, this test obviously fails the independent
sample assumption. To further understand the distribution of the subjective probability variables, we
perform the one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. For each age-gender group, we calculate the
average value of Probliv[75/85/10+] for the individual-years with Pardeath = 1 and Pardeath = 0.
The Wilcoxon z-score examines whether the signed difference between the two is statistically signifi-
cant. We repeat the exercise for Inlawdeath = 1 and Inlawdeath = 0. The results are reported in the
table below. The test score shows that the survival probability variable is lower for the Pardeath = 1
(Inlawdeath = 1) sample than the Pardeath = 0 (Inlawdeath = 0) sample in the same age-gender
group, and the difference is statistically significant at .99 level.
Pardeath=1 v.s Pardeath=0 Inlawdeath=1 v.s Inlawdeath=0
Z-score Prob>|Z| Z-score Prob>|Z|
Probliv75 -3.742 0.0002 -5.001 0.0000
Probliv85 -4.84 0.0000 -4.194 0.0000
Probliv10 -5.756 0.0000 -3.97 0.0001
Table 4: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test
Results from the Wilcoxon tests show that at a given age, individual-years with Pardeath = 1
(Inlawdeath = 1) have lower longevity prospects than individuals years with Pardeath = 0 (Inlawdeath =
0). The key advantage of these nonparametric tests is that they do not rely on normality of the sample
difference distributions, but they ignore individual heterogeneities and thus are potentially misleading.
For example, individuals from families that are financially constrained are more likely to experience
parental death (due to their lack of access to medical services) and report low survival prospects.
In the next section, we address this problem by exploiting the panel structure of the HRS data in
a regression framework. For within-person comparisons, the regression model essentially compares
the changes in ProblivX caused by a parent’s death versus the changes in ProblivX caused by an
in-law’s death. To see the advantage of the regression framework, note the previous example which
invalidates the Wilcoxon test does not introduce omitted variable biases to the regression coefficients:
to the extent that financial resources are stable over the survey periods, they are absorbed by the
individual-specific parameters and “differenced out”.
We caution that the panel features of the data and the within-effect regression framework do not
necessarily capture the causal relationship between ProblivX and Pardeath (Inlawdeath). For ex-
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ample, if an individual’s parent dies in wave T, and we observe the individual reports a lower value
of ProblivX in wave T+1, it does not necessarily mean that the individual adjusts down his or her
prediction in response to the parent’s death. Since health deterioration often accompanies age, the
individual may simply be correcting his or her predictions due to the aging factor. In Section 4, we
discuss various strategies to control for ages and compare their strengths and weaknesses.
5 Empirical Estimation
We examine how individuals form their survival probability predictions and whether the formation
process is Bayesian. According to Bayesian theory, absent any new information, individuals’ survival
probability assessments are given by the priors. Upon the arrival of new information, individuals
revise their priors according to the Bayes’ Rule. The new survival probability predictions which
account for the relevant new information are called the posteriors. These posteriors are constantly
updated as new information unravels over time. The two key ingredients of the Bayesian process are
priors and new information. In our context, the first category, i.e., the “priors”, includes factors that
are determined before the survey or variables that remain relatively stable during the survey waves.
Examples include health history, access to medical resources (wealth and income, insurance coverage,
access to hospitals/community health centers/care-givers), choice of occupation (which has to do
with exposure to health hazards), education (knowledge about health risk), character and personality
(optimistic versus pessimistic), etc. These “priors” provide the basis for forming mortality predictions.
The second category, i.e., the “new information”, consists of all new health information that becomes
available to the individual during the survey waves, including aging and health deterioration, new
information about population and individual-specific health risks, changes in mental well-being and
outlook on life, etc.
Bayesian probability theory requires that rational individuals update their prior beliefs conditional
on new information. The death of a non-blood relative due to health reasons, for example, might
cause the individual to update his or her assessment of the health of the population. On the other
hand, the death of a blood relative might cause the individual to update individual-specific health
risk assessment in addition to the population health risk assessment. This latter source of updates
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includes but is not limited to new information on genetic diseases (which is irrelevant for non-blood
relatives). As an example, consider a respondent whose household is close to a coal mine. If the mother
of the individual dies from pneumoconiosis (a lung cancer that is associated with long exposure to
coal dust), the individual in question, who had been exposed to the same hazards, may increase his
or her self-assessed probability of developing pneumoconiosis, and thus decrease his or her longevity
predictions, even though pneumoconiosis is not a genetic cancer.
This understanding motivates us to specify an empirical model which compares the relative magnitudes
of changes in subjective mortality probability assessments based on parental versus in-law’s death. We
experiment with three alternative approaches. Our first approach is a linear probability model, which
relies crucially on the cardinality of the subjective probability variables. Our second approach follows
the work of Hurd and McGarry (2001) and estimates a binary logit model. This approach relaxes the
cardinality assumption but risks blurring the rich information contained in the original self-reported
mortality prediction variables. Our third approach is an ordered logit framework which combines the
strength of the linear probability model and the binary logit model. Within each specification, we
undertake various robustness checks by experimenting with alternative forms of controls, changing the
choices of bin cuts, etc.
The three empirical specifications establish whether the relative magnitudes of changes in subjective
mortality predictions due to parental death versus in-law’s death are “rational”. We then turn to an
examination of whether the absolute magnitudes of these coefficients are reasonable. To implement
this, we first estimate the in-sample respondents’ and respondents’ parents’ mortality tables. Utilizing
these mortality tables, we estimate the de facto changes in mortality risks that are associated with
parental death.
5.1 Linear Probability Model
We specify a linear updating model, accounting for the differential impact of parental death v.s in-law’s
death on mortality predictions. The model takes the form
Probliv[75/85/10+]it = ai + b1ParDeathit + b2InlawDeathit + eit (1)
16
where ProbLiv[75/85/10+]it is one of the three subjective likelihood variables we introduced in the pre-
vious section, ai is the time-invariant individual fixed characteristics, i.e., the “priors”. ParDeath is a
constructed binary variable which equals 1 if eitherMomDeath=1 or DadDeath=1, and equals 0 oth-
erwise. Similarly, InlawDeath is defined to be 1 if either MominlawDeath=1 or DadinlawDeath=1
and 0 otherwise3. The b coefficients measure by how much the dependent variables change from the
prior ai in the event of parental or in-law’s death.
We focus on the magnitudes of changes in subjective survival likelihoods due to changes in parents’
mortality statuses ( ∂ProbLivX∂ParDeath ) versus parents-in-law’s mortality statuses (
∂ProbLivX
∂InlawDeath). This strategy
has two main advantages. First, parents and parents-in-law are typically comparable in age and
other characteristics, which sharpens the empirical comparison. Second, given the relative elderly
sample of the Health and Retirement Study, the occurrence of death events among respondents’
parents and in-laws are likely to be health-related, giving us meaningful variations to test for the
hypothesis of interests. According to our classification, both parents’ and in-laws’ death fall under the
“new information” category. While the former conveys new information about both population risk
and individual-specific health risks, the latter conveys only new information on population risk. By
comparing the magnitudes of updates, we can assess whether and by how much individuals respond
to the arrival of new information. The empirical challenge is to control for other variables that enter
individual’s belief formation, including both the “priors” and other variables in the “new information”
category that might be correlated with the change of mortality status variables. The panel structure
of the Health and Retirement Study allows us to explicitly control for variables in the “prior” category:
the individual specific parameter ai which captures the private information available to the individual
prior to the survey vanishes from the fixed-effect model. The primary time-variant factor in the “new
information” category that affects individuals’ survival predictions is age. If left uncontrolled for, aging
and its effect on survival predictions may confound the relationship between the mortality predictions
and the parental (in-law’s) mortality statuses. In our baseline specifications, we control for ages by
first fitting cubic splines and then including the estimated splines as covariates.
Since the survey questions are asked slightly differently from year to year, and since economy-wide
factors may affect the general well-being of all respondents, we also include a vector of survey wave
3Since the mortality statuses of parents (in-law) of the opposite genders are highly correlated, and the relative
magnitude between them is irrelevant for our analysis, I construct these binary variables to streamline the analysis
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fixed-effect, Wave, in all regression models. With this refinement, the baseline regression model can
be written as
Probliv[75/85/10+]it = ai +Wave+AgeControl + b1ParDeathit + b2InlawDeathit + eit (2)
where AgeControl is a vector of age splines constructed above.
We are interested in the relative magnitudes of b1 and b2. As explained previously, a parent-in-
law’s death conveys adverse information about general health risks. We expect the signs of b2 to be
non-positive. In addition to general health risks, a parent’s death also conveys information about
family-specific mortality risks (lifestyle-related health problems, genetic disease, etc). We thus expect
the magnitude of b1 to be greater than b2 in absolute value.
The estimation results from 2 are reported in the table below.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES Probliv75 Probliv85 Probliv10 Probliv75 Probliv85 Probliv10
4 knots 4 knots 4 knots 5 knots 5 knots 5 knots
pardeath -0.547 -3.533*** -2.639*** -0.552 -3.568*** -2.778***
(0.61) (1.21) (0.93) (0.61) (1.22) (0.92)
inlawdeath 0.169 -1.602 0.954 0.168 -1.648 0.847
(0.60) (1.18) (0.87) (0.60) (1.18) (0.86)
agespline1 -0.351*** -0.398*** 0.959 -0.346*** -0.282** -1.113
(0.06) (0.11) (3.52) (0.07) (0.12) (3.44)
agespline2 2.436*** 3.435*** 4.161*** 2.512** 0.834 21.909***
(0.61) (0.95) (0.35) (1.07) (1.53) (0.89)
agespline3 -15.601** -4.498 -13.050*** -5.372 12.206** -56.028***
(7.68) (3.61) (0.78) (5.85) (6.18) (2.20)
agespline4 -10.331 -40.322*** 45.143***
(13.52) (13.25) (2.11)
Observations 53,511 28,284 61,508 53,511 28,284 61,508
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.07 0.003 0.007 0.078
F-test on pardeath=inlawdeath 0.716 1.283 7.983 0.724 1.268 8.312
0.398 0.257 0.005 0.395 0.26 0.004
F-test on age controls 12.11 6.852 278.161 11.383 6.845 330.587
0 0 0 0 0 0
F-test on wave FE 12.909 39.521 56.171 12.854 37.01 59.358
0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausmann test 179.314 23.448 162.44 176.792 28.603 146.912
0 0.001 0 0 0 0
Reported coefficients are from estimation of Equation (2). Dependent variable is the self-reported probability of
 living past 75/living past 85/ living for another decade or so. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. 
 ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
In addition to the parental and in-law's mortality status variables, all 6 columns include as controls wave 
fixed effects and age splines. Column 1-3 use age splines constructed using 4 knots. Column 4-6 use
 age splines constructed using 5 knots. The regression sample is limited to individuals above 50 in years.
See text for more details.
Table 5: Baseline Linear Probability Model
The table reports results from the baseline specifications with age splines. Column 1-3 report results
when the splines are constructed using 4 knots; Column 4-6 report results if the splines are constructed
using 5 knots. In each specification, the locations of the knots are selected according to Harrell’s
recommended percentiles, subject to the restrictions that the first and the last segments have at least
five values. Since the results are insensitive to the choice of knot numbers, we focus on the results
in Column 1-3. Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients on ParDeath and InlawDeath and the
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strength of identification vary across the survey questions in a systematic manner. The estimates from
the Probliv75 regression are consistently the weakest: the coefficient on ParDeath is not statistically
distinguishable from zero at conventional confidence levels. This anomaly is not surprising given that
the majority of the respondents to the Probliv75 question are younger than 65 in years, during which
time parental and in-law’s death occurs less often, leading to the small variation on the right-hand
side of the Probliv75 specification. The identification of the Probliv85 regression is also relatively
weak since the survey question corresponding to this variable is only asked in 4 waves. Despite these
discrepancies, the general pattern across all three panels is clear: the coefficient on parent’s death is
more negative and significant than the coefficient on in-law’s death. Because of the limitations of the
Probliv75 and Probliv85 specifications, we focus our attention on the Probliv10 regression henceforth.
The regression coefficient from the Probliv10 question predicts that a parent’s death is associated with
2.639 percentage point decrease in subjective probability of living for another decade or so, while a
parent-in-law’s death has no statistically significant effect on survival predictions. The F-test rejects
the regression coefficients on Pardeath and InlawDeath are equal at .99 level of significance. The
joint tests on wave fixed effects suggests that they are jointly significant at .99 level of significance.
The Hausmann test confirms the relevance of the individual fixed effects.
To provide some intuitive understanding about the magnitudes of these coefficients, we perform fixed
effect regressions of the survival probability variables on indicators of major diseases. We find that
the impact of parental death on mortality predictions is comparable to the impact of heart problem,
high blood pressure, arthritis and diabetes on mortality predication. The results of these regressions
can be found in the appendix.
Next we discuss several potential threats to the identification of the regression specification. First
we note that the identification of the baseline regression specification hinges on the sufficiency and
validity of the age controls. We should point out that aging is not the only time-variant factor that
enters the individuals’ belief formation. The crucial question is whether the age controls capture
the family of “new information” that is correlated with both parental (in-law’s) death and mortality
predictions. The sufficiency of age controls is not directly testable. Testing the the relevance of other
“new information” variables requires observing all the private information that unravels during the
survey period, which is not feasible even with HRS’s rich set of variables on health and aging. The
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difficulty is twofold: first, we observe only public information (i.e, questions asked by the survey)
but not private information. Second, all else equal the precision of statistical tests decreases with
the number of controls. In most of my analysis, I rely on the assumption that the parent’s and the
in-law’s death is uncorrelated with the immediate onset of non-health survival risks. In other words,
parental and in-law’s death affects survival predictions only by increasing the perceived likelihood of
future health risks4. On the other hand, we can test for the validity of the form of age controls and
examine the sensitivity of the regression coefficients to various forms of age controls. Specifically, in
addition to the age splines we used for the baseline specification, we experiment with two alternative
ways to control for ages.
1. Control for age using age dummies. Instead of fitting cubic splines, we include a full set of age
dummies on the right-hand side of the regressions. This strategy allows for arbitrary relationship
between ages and survival predictions at the cost of consuming a large number of degrees of
freedom. Compared with the cubic splines we used in our baseline estimation, age dummies do
not force the dependent variables to be a piece-wise function in the polynomials of ages.
2. Control for age using lifetable predictions. Specifically, for each individual-year we first calculate
the survival probabilities implied by the annual Vital Statistics life tables for an average person
in the same age-gender group. Since the life tables are constructed based on age, controlling
for the lifetable values effectively takes into account the aging factor. This strategy has the
advantage of introducing only one extra parameter to estimate. These lifetable values vary with
age and gender but is determinant. Essentially, this approach assumes the lifetable value of
survival probability is also a "prior". But unlike the time invariant private information prior
that is absorbed in ai, the lifetable value is readily available public information which affects
the entire sample homogeneously. In this framework, the parental and in-law’s death causes the
respondent to update his or her priors which are based on both private information (ai) and
public information (lifetable values).
4This assumption may fail in some cases. For example, consider a hypothetical respondent whose parents die from a
hurricane. Suppose the respondent lives in the same household and suffers substantial property loss. In this case, we will
likely observe the respondent adjusting down his or her survival predictions (due to the financial loss). But we cannot
attribute this adjustment to the parent’s death. We maintain that such cases, namely one-time non-health accidents
that lead to the respondent’s parent’s (or in-law’s) demise and the respondent’s decreasing longevity predictions are rare
and extreme.
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The results from these alternative age control strategies are reported in the table below. Column 1-3
report estimates from the age dummy specifications. Column 4-6 reports estimates from the lifetable
prediction specifications.
1 2 3 7 8 9
VARIABLES Probliv75 Probliv85 Probliv10 Probliv75 Probliv85 Probliv10
dummy dummy dummy lifetable lifetable lifetable
pardeath -0.446 -2.823** -2.608*** -0.467 -3.586*** -1.817**
(0.64) (1.31) (0.97) (0.57) (1.18) (0.88)
inlawdeath -0.001 -2.362* 0.879 -0.38 -2.001 0.508
(0.64) (1.26) (0.88) (0.57) (1.24) (0.84)
Observations 48,160 23,952 58,086 50,968 23,855 55,089
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.086 0.004 0.013 0.082
F-test on pardeath=inlawdeath 0.24 0.064 6.94 0.012 0.84 3.498
0.624 0.801 0.008 0.914 0.359 0.061
F-test on age controls 42.09 1011.06 463.792 2.241 7.963 1834.376
0 0 0 0.134 0.005 0
F-test on wave FE 10.567 19.392 51.574 14.841 55.917 31.534
0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausmann test 214.67 186.401 192.468 86.858 6.354 4499.77
0 0 0 0 0.385 0
Reported coefficients are from estimation of Equation (2). Dependent variable is the self-reported probability of
 living past 75/living past 85/ living for another decade or so. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. 
 ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
In addition to the parental and in-law's mortality status variables, all 6 columns include as controls wave 
fixed effects and age splines. Column 1-3 use age splines constructed using 4 knots. Column 4-6 use
 age splines constructed using 5 knots. The regression sample is limited to individuals above 50 in years.
See text for more details.
Table 6: Alternative Ways to Control for Ages
The general pattern of the estimates are comparable to the baseline regression estimates using age
splines. In all specifications, the regression coefficients on ParDeath are more negative and significant
than the corresponding coefficients on InlawDeath, although the magnitudes of these coefficients
depend on model specifications. We restrict our attention to the Probliv10 question. The age-dummy
regression predicts a 2.608 percentage point decrease in subjective survival probability due to parental
death, while the lifetable regression predicts a 1.817 percentage point decrease in subjective survival
probability. The magnitudes of the coefficients from the three age-control strategies are pair-wise
22
comparable in magnitudes and levels of significance.
The fact that the regression coefficients are quite robust to various forms of age control is reassuring.
A more substantial source of threat to identification arises from sample selection. By construction,
selection into sample is conditional on the respondent being alive. Respondents who stay alive despite
parental death are likely to be those who overcome genetic disadvantages: they may be healthier than
an average person in the population and are less susceptible to the health deterioration that accompa-
nies aging. For lack of better term, we refer to them as “long-livers”. Conditional on ParDeath = 1,
the observed sample consists of a mixture of normal survivors and the long-livers, which will bias the
mortality predictions upward relative to the ParDeath = 0 sample. This source of selection is more
prominent at the higher end of the age distribution: for the genetically disadvantaged, living past 50 is
perhaps not surprising, while living past 90 signals great health. In other words, as age increases, the
regression sample consists of a greater proportion of “long-livers” relative to normal survivors. Note
that this selection effect tends to attenuate the regression coefficients toward zero. In other words,
the absolute value of the estimated regression coefficient on Pardeath, which suffers from the selec-
tion bias, can be viewed as a conservative lower bound of the underlying “true” regression coefficient.
The fact that the estimated regression coefficient on ParDeath is negative and significant despite the
potential selection bias lends credence to our key observations.
We should point out at the outset that our model is not meant to be a test for rationality. Rather,
it is a test to detect irrationality. In other words, b1 < b2 < 0 does not provide sufficient evidence
to conclude that people are rational Bayesian belief formers. To see this, assume that a parent’s
death causes more distress than an in-law’s death. Even if the individual does not update mortality
predictions differentially between the two events, the mere “sadness” factor may cause the individual to
report a lower longevity prediction in the event of a parent’s death. If we had observed the reason why
the individual updated more based on the parent’s death, we would classify him or her as “irrational”.
But this kind of irrationality eludes our structural model.
Moreover, our model is by no means perfect even for detecting irrationality. Suppose the estimates of b1
and b2 are such that b1 = b2≤0, i.e., the magnitudes of b1 and b2 are non-positive but indistinguishable.
According to our model, we would conclude that the sample as a whole is “inattentive” to the richer
health information conveyed by a parent’s (relative to an in-law’s) death. This need not be the case.
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In fact, if the reason for the parent’s death is car accident, then by Bayes’ Rule, rational individuals
should not update at all based on such events. We assert that for the sample as a whole, such events
are rare: given the age distribution of the HRS respondents, aging and disease constitute the main
reasons for parental and in-law’s death events.
The lack of comprehensiveness of the regression model does not restrict us from achieving maximum
precision within the framework of the model. In addition to the baseline linear probability model
above, we test for the robustness of the model by estimating various regression specifications under
alternative assumptions.
5.2 Binary Logit Model
As noted previously, the cardinal interpretation of the dependent variables is cause for concern. As
a first step toward relaxing this assumption, we construct a set of binary indicators of “high relative
subjective survival probability”. Specifically, for each individual-year, we use the previously calculated
survival probabilities implied by the annual Vital Statistics life tables for an average person in the same
age-gender group, and construct a set of “relative survival probabilities” as the ratio of the reported
survival probabilities to the corresponding lifetable values. Next we collapse these “relative survival
probabilities” into binary variables which equal one if the value of the ratio is above one. Call this
resulting variable RProbliv[75/85/10+]_ORD25. RProbliv_ORD2[75/85/10+] = 1 corresponds to
a higher-than-population-average subjective survival probability (inclusive) of living past 75/living
past 85/living for another decade or so, while RProbliv_ORD2[75/85/10+] = 0 corresponds to a
lower-than-population-average subjective survival probability of living past 75/living past 85/living
for another decade or so. 6 Figure 3 plots the distributions of these variables.
5Note that the indicator of “high relative survival probability” is a binary ordinal measure, which can be viewed as a
special case of the ordinal logit where the number of bins equals two. Hence I use the same variable naming format as
the ordered logit specifications.
6Both probit and the logit model are nonlinear models commonly used when the range of the dependent variables is
naturally restricted. But we drop the fixed-effect probit model due to its inconsistency.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Binary Dependent Variables
The baseline binary logit model is obtained by replacing the dependent variables in the linear proba-
bility model with the RProbliv variables constructed above, i.e.,
LogitPr(RProbliv[75/85/10+]_ORD2|Xit) = ai +Wave
+b1ParDeathit + b2InlawDeathit + eit
where LogitPr(Y |X) indicates the probability distribution of Y conditional on X in a logit model,
i.e., LogitPr(Y |Xit) = exitb/(1 + exitb) and Xit is shorthand for the vector of controls included in the
above equation.
In this specification, the differences among the Probliv75, Probliv85 and Probliv10 questions are not
of primary interests. To achieve maximum power of the statistical tests, we create a long panel by
pooling data from all three questions and control for which question is asked on the right-hand side.
The following equation reflects this modification.
LogitPr(RProbliv_ORD2|Xit) = ai +Wave+Ques (3)
+b1ParDeathit + b2InlawDeathit + eit
where Ques is a vector of question fixed-effects. Intuitively, this model assumes that the individual
has some assessment about whether he or she is less risky than the general population in the same
age-gender group. The death of his or her parent or parent-in-law causes a rational individual to
update this assessment downward.
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The estimates from the pooled sample are reported in Column 1 of Table 7 below. Since the linear
regression and the logit regressions are inherently different, the regression coefficients are not directly
comparable. For easier comparison, in Column 2 we calculate the marginal effects evaluated at the
sample mean. The estimates show that a parent’s death is associated with a 5.7 percentage point
decrease in the probability of reporting higher-than-population-average survival prospects, while a
parent-in-law’s death is associated with a 3.57 percentage point decrease in such probability, although
the difference between two is only marginally significant. As in the linear probability specification, the
F-test on the wave fixed effects confirms the significance of these controls. The question fixed effects













F-test on pardeath=inlawdeath 1.564
0.211
F-test on wave FE 643.265
0
F-test on question FE 666.053
0
Reported coefficients are from estimation of Equation (3). Dependent variable is binary indicator of having
above average survival predictions relative to the same age-gender group. Standard errors are clustered at
individual level. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level,
respectively. In addition to the parental and in-law's mortality status variables, all 6 columns include as
controls wave fixed effects and question fixed effects. Column 1 reports regression coefficients from logit
model. Column 2 reports the marginal effects evaluated at sample mean. The regression sample is limited
to individuals above  50 in years. See text for more details.
Table 7: Results from Baseline Logit Model
This binary logit approach is closely related to Hurd and McGarry (2002), which also use subjective
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mortality predictions as the key dependent variables. Their baseline specification takes the form
D[HighSurvivalProb = 1] = 1− 2e−xb/(1 + e−xb)
where [HighSurvivalProb = 1] is an indicator of self-reported likelihood variable being above a chosen
threshold, say 50, and x is the vector of independent variables including changes (i.e., difference
between Wave2 and Wave1 values) of the respondent’s parents’, spouse’s and siblings’ mortality
statuses, the respondent’s own health, etc. Observe that this specification is the logistic analog of
first-difference method, which is mechanically similar to the fixed-effect method we specified previously.
Our approach is different from Hurd and McGarry (2002) in the following three respects. First, we
use relative survival probability as the dependent variables. The threshold value 1 has more natural
interpretation, i.e., whether the assessment is above or below population average, while in Hurd and
McGarry (2002), the choice of cut is arbitrary and the estimates are sensitive to the selected threshold,
which is closely related to the focal responses issue at 50.
Second, the authors are mainly interested in explaining the variation of subjective probabilities. They
hypothesize that the family members’ (parents’/spouse’s/siblings’) mortality variables collectively af-
fect the respondent’s mortality predictions by conveying genetic information, causing psychological
distress, etc, and thus include them on the right-hand side and test for their joint significance. On the
other hand, we are primarily interested in the differences between the magnitude of the coefficients
on parents’ and parents-in-law’s mortality statuses, and use this information to study whether the
subjective mortality predication are formed in a rational way.
Third, only the first and the second wave of the HRS data were available at the time the thesis was
written. The addition of more survey waves allows us to fully exploit the panel structure of the data.
The additional data also gives us more power to test our hypotheses of interests.
5.3 Ordered Logit Model
In addition to the binary logit specification 3, we also estimate ordered logit model by clustering
the dependent variables into more than two bins. The key advantage of the binary logit model is
that it does not impose cardinal interpretations on the subjective likelihood variables, thus partially
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alleviating the measurement error problem of the linear probability model. On the other hand, we
risk losing relevant information by collapsing the dependent variables into a single binary measure.
These considerations motivate me to exploit finer ordinal information contained in the subjective
probability variables. To this end, we group the dependent variables into N bins and call the new
variables RProbLiv_ORD[N ]. This resulting variable has two features: (1) The bins are ordered.
Higher values of RProbLiv_ORD[N ] unambiguously indicate higher values of the original variable
RProbLiv. (2) Differences within each bin are ignored. For example, if the bin cuts are chosen
to be (0, 0.5, 1, 2), a relative survival probability of 1.2 and 1.3 will be indistinguishable since both
belong to the “above population average but less than 200% of population average” category. By this
procedure, we transform the original cardinal report profile RProbLiv into a coarser ordinal report
profile RProbLiv_ORD[N ]. We then apply the ordered logit framework to this new ordinal variable.
Note that the binary logit specification can be viewed as the special case where N = 2.
Specifically I assume the true relative subjective survival probability RProbLiv∗ is an unobserved
latent variable determined by the following equation
RProbLiv∗ = ai +Wave+Question (4)
+b1ParDeathit + b2InlawDeathit + e*it
where e∗it is a random error with logistic distribution.
The observed subjective prediction RProbLiv_ORD[N ] is related to the underlying true survival
probability via the following.
RProbliv_ORD[N ]it = 0 if 0 < RProbliv∗it < C1
= 1 if C1 < RProbliv
∗
it < C2




= n− 1 if Cn−1 < RProbliv∗it < Cn
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The probability that RProbliv_ORD[N ]it = k is given by
Pr(RProbliv_ORD[N ]it = k|Xit) =
Y(Ck − ai −Wave−Question− b1ParDeathit − b2InlawDeathit)
−Y(Ck−1 − ai −Wave−Question− b1ParDeathit − b2InlawDeathit)
where Y(.) denotes the cumulative logistic distribution.
The b1 (b2 ) coefficients should be interpreted with care. They measure the marginal effect of
ParDeath (InlawDeath) on the latent variable RProbliv∗.. The marginal effects of ParDeath
(InlawDeath) on RProbliv_ORD[N ] at a given point is obtained by multiplying b1 (b2 ) by the
density of the logistic function at that point.
We start with N = 4, i.e, grouping the dependent variables into 4 bins. This variable is set to equal
0 if the corresponding relative subjective probability is between 0 and 0.5, i.e., the reported survival
probability is less than 50% of population average survival probability, equal 1 if the corresponding
relative subjective probability is between 0.5 and 1, equal 2 if the corresponding relative survival
probability is between 1 and 2, and equal 3 if the corresponding relative survival probability is greater
than 2. The distributions of the constructed variables are reported in the figure and below.
Figure 4: Distribution of RProbLiv_ORD4 Variables
With cross-section data the ordered logit model is straightforward to estimate. The implementation is
much more complicated with panel data, where individual-specific fixed effects need to be controlled
for. In linear models these time-invariant effects can be differenced out. The analogous method,
however, is not in general valid for nonlinear models. Several consistent estimators have been proposed,
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e.g., Chamberlain’s CML estimator, Das and van Soest’s two-step estimator, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
Frijters’ endogenous dichotomization estimator and Baetschmann et al.’s BUC estimator.
We apply the BUC estimator due to its consistently good performance in simulations and its relatively
intuitive estimation structure. The BUC estimator hinges on the consistency of binary logit model
with fixed effect. The basic idea is to first reduce the N -bin ordered logit model to binary logit models,
which yields (N − 1) possible choices of cutoffs with the corresponding marginal effects β1,β2, ...βN−1.
The BUC estimator is defined as the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of the joint distribution of
the reduced form binary logit models, where the β1,β2, ...βN−1 coefficients are constrained to be the
same. Baetschmann et. al (2011) proves the consistency of the BUC estimator and shows that it
outperforms the popularly used Das and van Soest’s two-step estimator, especially in finite samples.
The results from ordered logit model are reported in Column 1 of the Table below.
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
VARIABLES Rprobliv_ord4 Rprobliv_ord4 Rprobliv_ord4 Rprobliv_ord4 Rprobliv_ord6 Rprobliv_ord6
choice of cutting point (0.5,1,2) (0.5,1,2) (0.8,1,1.2) (0.8,1,1.2) (0.5, 0.8,1,1.2,2) (0.5, 0.8,1,1.2,2)
marginal effect marginal effect marginal effect
pardeath -0.256*** -0.0608*** -0.226*** -0.0545*** -0.269*** -0.0652***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
inlawdeath -0.055 -0.0132 -0.086 -0.0211 -0.086 -0.0212
(0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01)
ques75 -0.494*** -0.121*** -0.484*** -0.119*** -0.494*** -0.122***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ques85 0.431*** 0.1031*** 0.397*** 0.0962*** 0.408*** 0.0996***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Observations 100,476 98,598 160,665
F-test on pardeath=inlawdeath 5.709 1.906 3.528
0.017 0.167 0.06
F-test on wave FE 2832.673 1850.633 1954.75
0 0 0
F-test on question FE 1402.232 1247.009 1357.394
0 0 0
Reported coefficients are from estimation of Equation (4). Dependent variable is an ordered scale of relative survival probabilities to the same age-gender group. 
Standard errors are clustered at individual level. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
In addition to the parental and in-law's mortality status variables, all 6 columns include as controls wave fixed effects and question fixed effects. 
Column 1 reports regression coefficients from the ordered logit model with bin cuts (0.5,1,2). Column 2 reports regression coefficients from the ordered logit model
 with bin cuts (0.8,1,1.2). Column 3 reports regressions coefficients from the ordered logit model with bin cuts (0.5,0.8,1,1.2,2).
The corresponding marginal effects are evaluated at sample mean. The regression sample is limited to individuals above 50 in years. See text for details
Table 8: Results from Ordered Logit Model
Column 2 and 3 of the table reports results from the ordered logit using alternative choices of bin
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cuts. The marginal effects are evaluated are evaluated at the sample mean. According to the marginal
effect estimates, a parental death results in approximately 5 or 6 percentage point decrease in the
chance of “downgrading” the survival prospects (i.e., switch from a bin with index K to a bin with
index K − 1). Such effects are significant at .99 level of confidence. On the other hand, we do not
observe such systematic “downgrading” due to in-law’s death. These patterns are in accordance with
the Bayesian rationality hypothesis.
5.4 Quantitative Test
Thus far the three empirical tests (linear probability model, binary logit model and ordered logit model)
have delivered estimates that are consistent with rational Bayesian updating. However, within the
Bayesian belief formation framework, our test is qualitative. The results only indicate the direction of
updates is sensible and the relativemagnitudes between the coefficients on ParDeath and InlawDeath
are as expected, but do not say anything about whether the absolute magnitude of these coefficients
are reasonable.
Addressing this concern is challenging since the Health and Retirement Study does not explicitly ask
for the reason for parent’s (and in-law’s) death. Presumably the health-related information content
of a parent’s death due to genetic cancer is very different from that of a parent’s death in a car
accident. Absent this information, it is impossible to determine precisely what is the “right” amount
of updates following a parent’s (or in-law’s) death for a given individual. In this sub-section, we design
two alternative quantitative tests for rationality. Both tests inevitably impose further assumptions on
the structure of private information. The first test relies on minimal assumptions about the relative
informativeness of different events and establishes upper bounds on the absolute value of the rational
amount of updates. The second test relies on knowledge about the population hazard rates and gives
point estimates of the rational amount of updates. Next we discuss both approaches in details.
5.4.1 Upper Bounds on Rational Updates
It is reasonable to assume that a parent’s death affects mortality prospects through either or both of
the following two channels:
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• Conveying new information about the respondent’s own-health status, e.g., increasing probabil-
ities of getting certain diseases, etc.
• Exposing the respondent to greater chances of experiencing psychological distress, which may
cause deterioration in physical conditions or decrease longevity predication at any given physical
conditions.
Given this assumption, we can show mathematically that for a rational individual the parental death’s
impact on subjective mortality predictions should not exceed the joint impact of the actual occurrence
of diseases and the actual onset of psychological problem. In the Bayesian framework, this assumption
is the necessary condition of the following statement
Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath, D) = Prob(Living past X year|D)
where D is an aggregate measure of the occurrence of diseases and psychological problems. Intuitively,
the statement says that the parental death variable contains no additional information after controlling
for the actual onset of physical diseases and psychological problems(i.e. conditional independence).
Formally, we have
Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 1, D)− Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 0, D)
< Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 1, D = 1)− Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 0, D = 0)
< Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath, D = 1)− Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath, D = 0)
where the first < follows from the adversity of the onset of diseases and psychological problems, i.e.,
Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 1, D) > Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 1, D = 1)
and Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 0, D) > Prob(Living past X year|Pardeath = 0, D = 0),
and the second < follows from the conditional independence assumption.
To test for this, we repeat all regressions in the thesis by replacing ParDeath and InlawDeath by
a joint indicator of physical and psychological problem.7 The table in the appendix confirms that
7In the HRS data we observe if the respondent ever had ANY of the following conditions: cancer, high blood pressure,
heart problem, diabetes, lung problems, strokes or arthritis, or psychological problem. The joint indicator indicates the
number of disease categories that the respondent report having. Note that in the fixed effect specification, the coefficient
identified on the joint indicator has the interpretation similar to that of ParDeath (InlawDeath), i.e., the percentage
change in RProbLiv associated with the onset of new disease.
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the sample passes this rationality test by a substantial margin. However, we should caution that the
mortality prediction response to the onset of cancer is two standard deviations above that of any other
diseases, which likely drives the large negative coefficient on the joint indicator.
5.4.2 Point Estimate of Rational Updates
The advantage of the nonparametric bounding exercise is that it relies on minimal assumptions. On
the other hand, the upper bound established by the test is too high to be informative for our purposes.
To get sharper bounds, we design an alternative test as follows. We estimate within-sample life tables
separately for individual-years with at most one demised parent versus individual-years with two
demised parents. Specifically, for each age X in the range [50, 80], we calculate the percentage of
individual-years who die at age X, separately for individual-years with different number of demised
parents. The resulting hazard rate table is given in the figure below. Since the HRS sample is relatively
senior in age, it is not surprising that the sample used to estimate the at-most-one-demised-parents
schedule is relatively imprecise, especially at the higher end of respondents’ age distribution, where
living parents are rarely observed.
Figure 5: Estimated Hazard Rate
Using these estimated hazard rates, we construct the cumulative survival probability tables at each
X. Formally, the cumulative survival probability at age X, conditioning on parents’ mortality status
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is given by




where h(j) denotes the hazard rate at age j , which we have estimated above. The corresponding
cumulative survival probabilities are reported in the Figure below.
Figure 6: Estimated Cumulative Survival Probabilities
Next we translate the unconditional cumulative probabilities into conditional cumulative probabilities
of living past 80 at each age X, i.e., Prob(Age at Death ≥ 80|Age at Death ≥ X,D). Consider
a hypothetical individual who is “rational” and uses the life-tables we construct above to form her
subjective probability assessment of living past 80. Suppose she starts at age 67 with both parents
dead. She would then calculate the conditional cumulative survival probability of living past 80 using
the “at least 1 death” schedule, i.e, Prob(X ≥ 80|X ≥ 67, D = 1).
Consider another hypothetical rational individual who is also at age 67, with both parents alive. If she
expects both of her parents to remain alive until her age exceeds 80, then her “rational” calculation
will be given by Prob(X ≥ 80|X ≥ 67 , D = 0). On the other hand, if she expects parental death to
occur when her age is 69, the “rational” amount of update is given by Prob(X ≥ 80|X ≥ 69, D =
1) × Prob(X ≥ 69|X ≥ 67, D = 0). Graphically, this is represented by a discrete jump from one
schedule to the other at age X.
More generally, for an individual at age Z, if she knows for sure that the parental death will occur
34
when her age is Y (Y > Z), the “correct” amount of update is given by
Prob(X ≥ 80|X ≥ Y, D = 1)× Prob(X ≥ Y |X ≥ Z, D = 0).
Notice the example of the first hypothetical individual is the special case where Y = 80. Since we do
not observe whether or when the respondent expects parental death to occur, we construct the lower
and upper bound of rational updates. Specifically, Let R(Z) denote the rational range of updates at










{Prob(X ≥ 75|X ≥ K,D = 1)× Prob(X ≥ K|X ≥ Z,D = 0)}
}
The constructed R(Z) is plotted in the figure below.
Figure 7: Rational Range of Absolute Updates
The bounding exercise allows respondents to have arbitrary beliefs about the parents’ age at death,
while the “true” population average of the “rational” amount of updates depends on the probability
distribution of parent’s death at the respondent′s age, which is reported in the figure below.
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Figure 8: Parent’s Hazard Rate at Respondent’s Age
Without further assumption, at a given age T , a respondent’s own mortality status and his/her parent’s
mortality status form four possible combinations. If the respondent (parent) is alive in period T , then
in the next period T+1, the respondent (parent) either survives or dies, and the probability is given by
the respondent’s (parent’s) corresponding hazard rate at T + 1. On the other hand, if the respondent
(parent) is dead in period T , in the next period T +1, the respondent (parent) remains dead for sure.
In the language of Stochastic Processes, “death” is absorbing while “survival” is transitory. Formally,
denote the parent’s mortality hazard at respondent’s age j as ParHazj (abbreviation: PHj) and the
respondent’s own mortality hazard at age j as RespHaz0j (abbreviation: RH
0
j ) if both parents are
alive and RespHaz1j (abbreviation: RH
1
j ) if otherwise. The state space of the Markov Chain consists
of all four possible combinations of {respondent’s mortality status, parent’s mortality status}. Let
State 1 represent {respondent alive, parent alive}, State 2 represent {respondent alive, parent dead},
State 3 represent {respondent dead, parent alive} and State 4 represent {respondent dead, parent
dead}. At a given age j, the transition matrix Pj,j+1 from age j to age j + 1 is given by
Pj,j+1=

(1−RH0j )(1− PHj) (1−RH0j )PHj RH0j (1− PHj) RH0jPHj
0 (1−RH1j ) 0 RH1j
0 0 (1− PHj) PHj
0 0 0 1

36
Hence, starting from a given age j, at age 80 the probability distribution across the four possible states






where pij denote the initial state and σ
q
j,80 the terminating state. If the respondent’s parents are alive
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0 1 0 0
]
. The magnitude
of absolute “rational” updates is given by σ0j,80(4)− σ1j,80(4), and the magnitude of relative “rational”
updates is the absolute magnitude normalized by the corresponding lifetable value at age j. The table
below summarizes the estimated rational updates.
Age Rational Updates SE lower bound upper bound
50 0.004 0.0068 -0.0096 0.0176
51 0.0043 0.0071 -0.0099 0.0185
52 0.0047 0.0075 -0.0103 0.0197
53 0.0061 0.0079 -0.0097 0.0219
54 0.0086 0.0084 -0.0082 0.0254
55 0.0103 0.009 -0.0077 0.0283
56 0.0125 0.0099 -0.0073 0.0323
57 0.013 0.0108 -0.0086 0.0346
58 0.0136 0.0118 -0.01 0.0372
59 0.0124 0.0129 -0.0134 0.0382
60 0.0137 0.0143 -0.0149 0.0423
61 0.0163 0.0156 -0.0149 0.0475
62 0.0169 0.0169 -0.0169 0.0507
63 0.017 0.0192 -0.0214 0.0554
64 0.02 0.0209 -0.0218 0.0618
65 0.0216 0.0233 -0.025 0.0682
66 0.0271 0.0252 -0.0233 0.0775
67 0.024 0.0275 -0.031 0.079
68 0.0234 0.03 -0.0366 0.0834
69 0.0181 0.0332 -0.0483 0.0845
70 0.0127 0.0357 -0.0587 0.0841
71 0.0075 0.0387 -0.0699 0.0849
72 -0.04 0.0417 -0.1234 0.0434
73 -0.0104 0.0437 -0.0978 0.077
74 -0.0144 0.0462 -0.1068 0.078
75 -0.009 0.048 -0.105 0.087
2 SE Interval
Table 9: Estimated Rational Updates
At sample average age 67, the 95% confidence interval of the rational amount of update is [-0.031,
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0.079]. We use this estimate as the benchmark value of rational updates.
We summarize all relevant estimates in our empirical test8 in Table 10. For easier comparison, we
convert the regression coefficients from percentage points to decimals. The “Estimated Bounds of
Rational Updates” column reports the upper and lower bounds of rational updates if we allow re-
spondents to have arbitrary beliefs about the parents’ future death date. These value correspond to
inf{R(Z) : Z = 67} andsup{R(Z) : Z = 67}, respectively. The “Estimated Bounds with 2SE Bin” col-
umn accounts for the fact that the hazard tables and the resultant R(Z) are estimated with standard
errors. The “Estimated Rational Updates” column reports the estimated amount of updates assuming
that the probability of parent’s death follows the population mortality hazard rates as in Figure 8.
The “2SE Bin of Rational Updates” report the 2 standard error confidence interval of the estimated
amount of rational updates.
The comparison among the columns yields three basic conclusions. First, the regression coefficient
lies within the bounds of rational updates (allowing for arbitrary beliefs about the timing of parent’s
demise) and the 2 standard error bin of rational updates (estimated using population parent’s hazard
rate), providing evidence in favor of the rationality hypothesis. Second we note that the 95% confidence
interval of the amount of rational updates is relatively wide, reflecting the fact that the within-
sample lifetables are estimated relatively imprecisely. This is not surprising since at the higher end
of the age bracket the number of observations with alive parents become very small. Finally, we
note that the regression coefficient does not coincide well with the estimated amount of rational
updates. The discrepancy between the regression coefficient and the estimated coefficient could arise
from individuals’ private information about their parents’ health conditions and longevity prospects.
The regression coefficients which are based on individual fixed effect models partially incorporate the
private information while the estimated coefficient does not. On the other hand, the fact that the
regression coefficients are located close to the lower end of the bound seems to suggest a weak tendency
to overestimate the impact of parental death on survival prospects.
8Note the choice of age bracket [50, 80] in the lifetable estimation makes the coefficients from the ProbLiv10 regression
















































































































































































































































5.5 Other Potential Sources of Behavioral Biases
Our empirical tests on Bayesian belief formation fail to detect strong evidence against rationality.
However, we should point out that there are other types of potential behavioral distortions that lie
beyond the realm of our previous analysis. To explore other potential sources of irrationality, we study
the survey results from RAND American Life Panel (ALP), a qualitative survey which is designed
specifically to understand factors that contribute to the limited demand for long-term care insurance.
The surveys were conducted on a sample of 1,512 Americans above 50 years in age, with an average age
of 61, making it comparable to the HRS sample. The questionnaire asks the respondents to rate their
agreement on a scale of 1-5 to various statements. The survey results show several striking features.
• Individuals have mistaken beliefs about whether Medicare and private insurance covers long-
term care utilization. 27.6% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement
“Medicare covers the use of long-term care” and 14.7% either agree or strongly agree with the
statement “most private health insurance policies cover extended long term care”.
• Individuals have limited understanding of their state’s tax subsidy to long-term care insurance.
While 59% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that a tax deduction or credit is an
important consideration in their long-term care insurance purchasing decisions, a vast majority
of 78% of them are not aware if their state offers tax incentives for long-term care insurance
plans. Among the remaining 22% who believe they know whether a tax subsidy is available in
their state, 30% have incorrect knowledge.
• Individuals have limited knowledge about the long-term care insurance product. Despite 40%
of the individuals agree or strongly agree that they have “thought a lot of needing long-term
care”, 72% of them report only knowing “a little” about long-term care insurance. 2% of the
individuals state that they own a long-term policy, but when asked about reason for purchase,
state that they in fact do not own such policies.
Incidentally, the RAND-ALP survey also asks about the respondents’ subjective belief of living past
85 in years. The data shows that a 10 percentage point increase in subjective probability of living
past 85 is associated with 1% increase in the probability of being covered by long-term care insurance
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(significant at .95 level), although the cross-section nature and the small sample size of the RAND-
ALP survey restricts us from conducting detailed regression analysis. The above evidence suggests
while individuals may process mortality relevant information rationally and condition their long-term
care insurance purchasing decisions on such beliefs, they have limited information about the coverage
of public programs (Medicare, tax subsidy) and private insurance plans. Together, these findings
suggest that easier access to information regarding tax incentives, policy availabilities could influence
long-term care insurance purchase decisions.
6 Conclusion
The small size of the private long-term care insurance market has long puzzled Economists. As
observed in Spinnewijn (2012), for a given price level, low valuation and irrationality could lead to
the same observed low demand responses, but the welfare implications are potentially different. In
the former scenario, the potential welfare gain from government intervention is small: by definition,
the previously uninsured are also those who have low valuations for the long-term care insurance,
and extending coverage to them yields little additional surplus. In the latter scenario, irrationality
bends the demand downward. To the extent that individuals are subject to behavioral heuristics, the
observed demand for insurance is suboptimal. If irrationality bends demand downward, the society
may benefit as a whole by extending coverage to the irrationally underinsured. Hence, from the policy-
making point of view, the optimal level of government involvement hinges crucially upon the reason
for low demand.
In this thesis, we test whether individuals update their mortality predictions based on mortality-
relevant new information, and whether they update more in response to more precise information.
We specify three alternative models: linear probability model with fixed effects, binary logit with
fixed effects, and ordered logit with fixed effects. Qualitatively, the three models deliver consistent
estimates: individuals decrease relative longevity predictions in response to a parents’ death and adjust
their predictions statistically more than a parent-in-law’s death. This is evidence in favor of rational
Bayesian belief formation. Given the time-constraints in answering survey questionnaires and the
high average age of the sample, the degree of sophistication we observe in the data is quite surprising.
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We conclude that when it comes to evaluating mortality prospects, the elderly are attentive to new
information, and form their beliefs accordingly. To sharpen our empirical tests, we perform a more
discerning quantitative test by comparing the regression coefficients from the empirical specifications
with the in-sample predicted amount of “rational” updates. Although the magnitudes of the regression
coefficients vary across model specifications, these coefficients lie between the upper and lower bounds
of the rational amount of updates. We note a weak tendency of the individuals to “overestimate”
the impact of parental death on their mortality prospects, but cannot distinguish whether the over-
response is due to irrationality or private information. Our findings highlight the intrinsic difficulty of
testing for rationality hypothesis in the presence of private information.
At first glance, the evidence seems puzzling given the poor performance in risk-assessment reported
in many Experimental Economics literature. We stress that making risk assessment in real life is
inherently different from making risk assessment in the laboratory settings. Mortality risks and the
related purchasing decisions of long-term care insurance have important implications on both the
individual’s and the family member’s financial and non-financial well-being. Risk assessments about
mortality involve much more careful consideration than those assessments obtained in laboratory data,
where the potential gain or loss is only monetary and small in magnitudes. Moreover, as an individual
ages overtime, he or she is exposed to more and more “first-hand” health-related information than
the young population, e.g., the recent death and the onset of health problems of family and friends,
etc. Hence, the belief formation process involves evolution and learning, which lowers the chances
of making miscalculations or being affected by random heuristics. The empirical evidence cautions
us against extrapolating evidence of irrationality in laboratory responses to more general settings,
especially when important resources arrangements are involved.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that rational risk assessment is only one aspect of “rationality”.
Other forms of behavioral distortions not captured by the empirical tests in this thesis could also distort
long-term care insurance purchasing behaviors. To explore other possible avenues of irrationalities
that may affect individuals’ demands for long-term care insurance, we study the survey responses to
RAND American Life Panel (ALP). Although the answers are largely qualitative, they suggest that a
nontrivial number of the respondents are not aware of the state of residence’s tax subsidies to long-
term care insurance purchase, mistakenly believe that long-term care is covered by Medicare, or are
42
not clear about their long-term care insurance coverage status (e.g. give contradictory answers when
asked whether they are covered by any long-term care insurance). These factors could potentially
lead to under-insurance. The evidence from the RAND American Life Panel (ALP) data does not
contradict the findings of the current thesis, however. Rather it stresses the need to make public policy
information more transparent and easily accessible to the elderly to help them make more informed
decisions about insurance purchasing decisions.
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8 Appendix
Probliv75 HIBP DIAB CANCR LUNG HEART STROK PSYCH ARTHR AGE
Probliv75 1.000
HIBP -0.097 1.000
DIAB -0.109 0.164 1.000
CANCR -0.056 0.030 0.034 1.000
LUNG -0.101 0.066 0.053 0.050 1.000
HEART -0.127 0.129 0.105 0.039 0.113 1.000
STROK -0.086 0.085 0.083 0.027 0.069 0.127 1.000
PSYCH -0.097 0.090 0.068 0.048 0.103 0.104 0.055 1.000
ARTHR -0.074 0.126 0.090 0.059 0.095 0.104 0.057 0.128 1.000
AGE 0.018 0.114 0.075 0.068 0.053 0.086 0.051 0.025 0.152 1.000
Probliv85 HIBP DIAB CANCR LUNG HEART STROK PSYCH ARTHR AGE
Probliv85 1.000
HIBP -0.071 1.000
DIAB -0.076 0.143 1.000
CANCR -0.037 0.033 0.043 1.000
LUNG -0.077 0.060 0.056 0.040 1.000
HEART -0.109 0.126 0.096 0.033 0.114 1.000
STROK -0.053 0.076 0.070 0.015 0.059 0.123 1.000
PSYCH -0.062 0.090 0.061 0.046 0.081 0.092 0.038 1.000
ARTHR -0.057 0.124 0.090 0.054 0.085 0.102 0.051 0.111 1.000
AGE 0.023 0.111 0.076 0.062 0.066 0.104 0.064 0.016 0.136 1.000
Table 11: Correlation Matrix of ProblivX and Health and Functionality Variables
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c1 2 3
VARIABLES Probliv75 Probliv85 Probliv10
High blood pressure -0.058 0.016 0.152
-0.197 -0.308 -0.191
Diabetes -0.289 -0.034 -0.159
-0.303 -0.434 -0.284
Cancer -2.092*** -1.782** -2.063***
-0.44 -0.801 -0.384
Lung problem -0.648** 0.307 -0.719***
-0.28 -0.408 -0.264
Heart problem -1.047*** -1.166*** -1.044***
-0.253 -0.345 -0.236
Stroke -2.436*** -2.597*** -1.153***
-0.642 -0.915 -0.412
Psychological problem -0.427** -0.198 -0.117
-0.216 -0.35 -0.213
Arthritis -0.182 0.086 -0.195
-0.188 -0.301 -0.182
Age -0.168*** -0.130** -1.126***
-0.029 -0.064 -0.027
SE clusted at individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions are run separately for each disease/aging variable.
Table 12: Fixed Effect Regressions on Major Health Events and Age
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